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2Roger Craine*
During mostofthe pasttwo decades, the housing
market in the·U.S. boomed while the stock market
faltered. The nominal return on single family
housing rose fairly steadily from 6.5 percent a year
in 1965 to over 15 percent in 1979. In the same
interval, stock market returns rose from 3percentto
only 5.5 percent. Since inflation acceleratedfrom 3
percent to almost 12 percent in the meantime, real
(inflation-adjusted) returns in the stock marketwere
negative through most ofthe 1970s. The real value
ofcorporate equities declined by 48 percent but the
real value ofa single family house increased by 26
percent.' As a consequence, the composition of
private wealth changedmarkedly. Thetotal value of
corporate equities compared to the total value of
owner-occupied housing declined by an astounding
. 150 percent between 1965 and 1980.
2
A numberofresearchers, e.g., Martin Feldstein,
Randall Pozdena, and Lawrence Summers, attrib-
ute most of the change in the value of housing
relative to corporatestockto me interactionofinfla-
tionand a non-indexedtax system. Taxable nominal
corporate profits rise more in percentage terms than
inflation because ofhistorical cost depreciation and
prevailing (first-in-first-out) inventory accounting
practices. As a result, inflation-adjusted after-tax
corporate profits actually decline with inflation.
Furth~rmore, stockholders must pay tax on purely
nominal stock market capital gains as inflation
pushes them into higher marginal brackets. Home-
owners, however, avoid or benefit from many tax
"non-neutralities." Owner-occupants consume the
flow ofservices their houses provide. This service
flowisanimputedrentpaymentthat adds toincome
inthe National Income Accounts butthe "inkind"
paymentis not counted as explicit taxable income
by th~ Internal Revenue Service. In addition, cap-
ital •gains taxes on·housing can be deferred or
*Visiting Economist at Federal Reserve Bank of
SaIl Francisco, ProfessorofEconomics, University
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avoided altogetherby using rolloverprovisions and
exemptions for those over age 55.
Theresearchers therefore concludedthatthe non-
neutralities in the tax systemwere capitalized in the
asset prices during the inflationary period of the
1970s. Moreover, they believe that the changing
relative asset values inducedchanges inthephysical
stock ofassets and the composition ofwealth.
Thus far in the Eighties, inflation has fallen
rapidlyfrom 12 percentin 1980 to under5percentin
1982. TheEconomic Recovery Actof1981 reduced
individual and business taxes, and tax indexing
slated to begin in 1985 should further reduce taxes.
As inflation recedes and the tax system is made
more equitable, the macroeconomic causes of the
housing boomwill presumably be eliminated. Inthe
1980s, the U.S. may also face the task ofworking
offan excess supply ofhousing createdby the mac-
roeconomic climate ofthe last decade. As a result,
economists that attribute the housing boom of the
1970sto macroeconomic .causes see a relatively
dismal future for the housing indUStry.
Theirline ofreasoning follows a traditional mac-
roeconomic approach in analyzing the changeSin
relative values. Theemphasis is onmacroeconomic
variables-inflation and taxes-while the compo-
sition of consumer demand is assumed constant
or relatively unimportalltat the nation-wideJevel.
The theoretical and empirical work by Feldstein,
Pomena, and Summers shows that macroeconomic
variables should and did affect the value of cor-
parate stock relative to owner-occupied housing in
the 1970s.
The 1970s, however, also witnessed majorde-
mographic shifts that affected the composition.of
cons~merdemancl' The traditional macroeconomic
aggregation assumption that the composition of
underlying demand is fairly stable was not valid in
that decade. Household formation, for ex.ample,
grew much more rapidly than housing starts. The
number of households in the 24-35 age cohort(survey data indicate that halfthe new home buyers
inthe 1970s fell inthis age cohorf) almost doubled
between 1960 (10 million) and 1980 (18 million).
Overthe same period, housing starts only increased
about 20 percent.
An increaseinhousing demand relative to supply
is astandard microeconomic explanationfortherise
in housing prices and homeconstruction. However,
since the baby boom enters the housing market
through a long and supposedly easily observed ges-
tation period, many believe the aggregate impact of
the demographic shift can be anticipated and there-
fore should have no significant effects.
Section I presents a briefdiscussion ofthe effect
ofan increase in the demandfor housing services on
the relative price of housing services, the relative
aSset price of houses, and investment in houses
relative to corporate capital. It concentrates on the
demographic effects and showsthatevenifthe baby
boom had been anticipated by the market andthere
were no inflation or tax distortions, demographic
changes would still have led to an increase in the
relative value ofhousing. Section II examines em-
pirical evidence from 1965 to 1980. The results
indicate thateitherinflation orhouseholdformation
can explain the value ofhouses relative tocorporate
stock in the 1970s. In fact, both probably influenced
the housing and stock markets in theSeventies.The
results also indicate that demographic factors will
continue to exert some·· demand pressure on the
housing market in the Eighties and make the out-
look for housing more sanguine.
I. Uncertain Demographics and Rates of Return
Other things being equal an increase in demand
for a product increases the relative price of that
product. The price mechanism sends a signal to
individual decisionmakers to transfer resources to
the high price (high profit) industry from lower
price (lowerprofit) industries. The short-run reallo-
cation in flow markets is straightforward and quite
simple. When demand shifts, some industries move
up their short-run supply curves by adding variable
inputs (labor) and other industries move down their
short-run supply curves by reducing variable in-
puts. If the shift is permanent (or long-lasting) the
capital stock must also be reallocated. Asset prices,
which reflect expected discounted future eamings,
will change and lead to a change in investment.
Both current and unknown future prices affect the
presentvalue ofassets and capitalallocation. More-
over, reallocating the capital stock is complex and
costly so the unknown future makes any major
capital decision risky.
The baby boom led to an obvious increase in the
demand for housing services. As children matured
they took jobs, left their parents' homes, and de-
manded housing. Most married and started families
whichincreasedthe demandforhousing. The bulge
in the age structure of the population created an
extraordinary demand for housing that required re-
sources to be reallocated toward housing and away
from otheractivities. The adultpopulationgrew at a
rate of3 million a year in the 1970s; in the 1960s, it
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grew at 2 million a year. The growth ofhouseholds
increased even more dramatically, from about 1
million a year in the 1960s to 1.75 million a year in
the 1970s.
Thechanging demographic structure ofthe popu-
lation had manyeconomic consequences thatcanbe
analyzed as the microeconomic substitution effect
of a change in the mix of consumer goods de-
manded, holding everything else constant. In this
section I assume total consumption, investment,
and wealth are fixed. This analysis illustrates that a
change in the mix ofconsumergoods demandedcan
change relative flow;md asset prices.
The service flow from housing (the services
housing provides, such as a place to sleep, eat, and
relax) is a perishable consumption good that can be
purchased by paying rent. Owner-occupants im-
plicitly pay themselves rent that equals the value of
the services they consume. At a fixed level of in-
come and saving, an increased demand for housing
services must be matched by a decreased demand
for othergoods. Theshift in the mix ofconsumption
demand is reflected in the relative flow prices ofthe
goods and services. In the simplest case, r~nts
would increase relative to the prices of other con-
sumption goods.
Asset prices depend on the current and future
income stream associated with the asset. Title to the
ass~t conveys the right to the future income stream
to the ownerofthe title. Forexample, the ownerofahouse will receive its current and future rent. The
present value of a house (PVH) is the stream of
future rents (RT+j) discounted to reflect theircurrent
value,
PVH = RT+,/(l+r) + RT+2/(l+d +RTd(l+r)3...,
where r is the discount rate. The prices of titles
reflect the market's evaluation ofthe future income
stream. If the market expects the rental rate to
increase relative to the priceofconsumergoods, the
present value ofhousing and house prices increase
relative to corporate capital. Since the aging ofthe
baby boom is easily predicted, the increased de-
mand for housing was (at least partially) expected.
Figure I shows the relationship betweenrent (R),
other prices (P), house prices (H) and stock prices
(S) assuming a one-time demand shift that is per-
fectly anticipated. (The stock of housing and cor-
porate capital is assumed fixed.)
The top panel shows the flow prices-rent and
the price ofotherconsumergoods. The demograph-
ic shift, which is assumed to occur in year T, in-
creases the demand for housing services and re-
duces the demand for other goods. As a result the
rent for houses rises, and otherprices fall in year T.
Since the change is permanent, rents exceed the
prices ofother goods thereafter (RT+i>PT+i)' When
the flow prices change, asset values also change.








(HT +i) must exceed the asset value of corporate
stock (ST+i) as shown in the bottom panel. How-
ever, asset prices depend on the entire stream
of future earnings and, therefore, change prior to
yearT.
The rate ofreturn to an asset is the sum offlow
income and capital gains expressed as a percent of
asset price. After year T, when asset prices are
constant, the rates ofreturn are,
Inaworldofcertainty, rates ofreturnon all assets
are equal, that is, rH = rs; otherwise, riskless ar-
bitrage opportunities exist. For example, ifthe rate
of return on housing exceeds the rate of return on
corporate stock, speculators (in theory) can sell
stock short and use the proceeds to buy houses. In
the process, they make a riskless profit. However,
as agents buy one asset and sell another, the asset
prices change to equalize the rates ofreturn.
Prior to year T, the flow income from the two
assets (RT-i> PT-i) is equal but the asset prices
change in anticipation of the demand shift. When
the future is perfectly anticipated, asset prices
change over time so that the rates of return are
alwaysequal, i.e.
RT-i+.lHT-i _ r _ PT-i+.lST-i
rH = HT-i - S - ST-i
House prices gradually rise (.lHT-i) to give
homeowners capital gains that offset the lower cur-
rent rents, while stock prices (.lSr-J gradually fall
to give equity holders capital losses that offset cur-
rent higher profits.
Afterperiod T, asset and flow prices are constant
but not equal. Prior to period T, flow prices were
constant and equal, but asset prices were changing.
Throughout the period, however, rates ofreturn are
equal.
Figure I illustrates the relationship between the
flow and asset prices in a stylized form. In this
example, the rates ofreturn had to be equal because
the investors saw the future withperfectclarity. The
actual relationship between flow and asset prices
is much more complicated. Even though one can
accurately predict the aging of the baby boom
generation, its demand for housing and its rate of
household formation is much more uncertain.Household fonnation depends on complex social
and.economic factors. The quality and quantity of
housing services can be varied and home purchases
delayed. Furthennore, home builders add to an ex-
isting supply which feeds back on house prices and
the rental rate. Construction has always been a
boomand bustindustry precisely becausestructures
are long-liveddurables and the future is uncertain.
In an uncertain environment, major shifts, such
as the aging of the baby boom, provide increased
opportunitiesfor profit but only at the cost ofbear-
ing additional risk. Building too far in advance
results in high vacancies, low rents, and sometimes
bankruptcy. The current glut ofcommercial office
space in many cities exemplifies the risky nature of
real estate speculation.
In this risky environment, the rate of return on
assets is likely to diverge as investors try to gain
access to the uncertain future.
II. Empirical Evidence
sury bill rate (see the Appendix for details). Ex-
pected inflation (OPE) and household fonnation
(HFE) are three-year averages for forecasts of
future rates ofchange of the consumer price index
and household fonnation from ARIMA models. 4
Summers tested the hypothesis that the short-run
expected inflation can "explain" the divergence in
the excess returns by regressing the excess returns
on expected inflation. Table 1 shows the results
from estimated equations ofthe fonn,
E
l = bo + bpPI; + ~
where E is the excess return and u is an error, or
omitted effects, and OPE is expected inflation.
Table 1*
Excess Returns and Expected
Household Formation:
Stock and Housing Markets
Dependent variable bo b1 R2
ESTOCK .14 -66.02 .44
(.96) (19.56)
*Standard errors in parentheses.
The regressions, based on annual data from 1965
to 1979, indicate that expected inflation has a statis-
tically significant depressing effect on the stock
market and a positive, although not statistically
significant, effect on housing. These results are
similar to Summers' who used a different data set
and measure ofthe change in expected inflation to
test the hypothesis. The results weakly support the
hypothesis that expected inflation increased the
demand for housing relative to other goods.
To test the hypothesis that household fonnation
The real price ofhomes increased by 26 percent
between 1965 and 1980. Over the same period, the
rate ofreturn to housing was over twice the rate of
return on corporate stock. These numbers are con-
sistentwith an increaseddemand for housing due to
an uncertain but expected rapid growth in house-
hold fonnation. They are also consistent with an
increased speculative demand for housing due to
accelerating inflation and distortions in the tax
system. The consequences ofthese two sources of
demand, however, have very different implications
for the 1980s. Ifdemographics caused the change,
demand will continue to grow but less rapidly than
in the 1970s and the prices of housing relative to
other assets will stabilize. On the other hand, ifthe
shiftinasset values was due only to inflation and tax
distortion, and we have disinflation and tax changes
in the 1980s, then relative home prices and home
construction will decline.
To test the proposition that anticipated household
fonnation and/or anticipated inflation increased the
rate ofreturn to housing and decreased the rate of
return on stocks in the short-run, I regressed the
excess return in each market on these variables.
This test extends the work of Summers who only
tested for the effect ofinflation.
Theexcess return in the stock market (ESTOCK)
is defined as the sum ofcapital gains plus dividends
as a percent of the beginning-of-period value less
the beginning-of-period Treasury bill rate. This is
the difference between the one-period holding yield
on stock and the return on an alternative "safe"
asset-Treasury bills. The excess return to housing
(EHOUSE) isthe rentplus capital gains as apercent





(51.27)"explains" the divergence in returns, I also esti-
matedequations ofthe form,
E! = c + clHFE + v. o ·t t
where HFE is expected household formation. Table
2gives the results.
Table 2*
Excess Returns and Expected Inflation:
Stockand Housing Markets
Dependentvariable Co Cl R2
ESTOCK -3.09 .002 .37
( .45) (.0006)
EHOUSE 4.75 .0003 .49
( .60) (.0001)
*Standard errors in parentheses.
The regression results indicate that expected
household formation had a statistically significant
depressing effect on the stock market and a statisti-
cally significant positive effect on the housing
market. These results provide somewhat stronger
statistical support for the hypothesis that the demo-
graphic changes increased the demand for housing
services relative to othergoods.
Obviously, there is no need to have an either/or
hypothesis. Economic data are not generated by a
controlled experiment and many factors change
simultaneously in the actual economy. To test the
hypothesis that expected inflation and household
formation "caused" the divergence in the rates of
return, I estimated equations ofthe form:
E, = do + d,DPE + d2HFE + w,.
Table 3 gives the results.
Theresults are consistent withthehypothesis that
both variables helpexplainthe short-run divergence
in the rates ofreturn. However, they are not strong
instatistical terms. Theonly statistically significant
coefficient of interest (atthe 5 percent or even 20
percent level) is the coefficient on expected house-
hold fonnationinthe excessreturntohousing equa-
tion. Expected inflation in this equation has a nega-
tive sign, contradicting the expected inflation
hypothesis at least for· housing; the coefficient,
however, is statistically insignificant.
It is not terribly surprising that the data cannot
cleanly separate the effects. The data are annual
(household formation is only reported on an annual
basis) and both household formation and inflation
accelerated in the 1970s.
5 But an F test of the null
hypothesis that neither expected inflation nor ex-
pected household formation affected the rates of
return can be rejected at the 95 percent confidence
level.
In summary, the data support the hypothesis that
one or the other or both expected inflation and
household formation influencedtha rateofreturn on
stock and housing over the period from 1965 to
1980, although the statistical evidence is not pre-
cise. However, economictheory and common sense
bolster the conclusion that inflation was bad for the
stock market and probably good for the housing
market, while the rapid increase in household for-
mation was good for the housing market and prob-
ably bad for the stock market.
Table 3*
Excess Returns, Expected Inflation, and Expected Household Formation:
Stockand Housing Markets
Dependent variable do d1 ds R2
ESTOCK .74 -52.78 .0005 .45
(1.73) (37.78) (.0011)
EHOUSE 7.02 -53.03 .0004 .55
(2.28) (51.41) (.0001)
*Standard errors in parentheses.
10III. Conclusion
During the past fifteenyears, .the total value of
corporate equities relative to the total value of
owner..occupiedhousing fell by an incredible 150
percent. The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a massive
change in the value and composition of privately
held wealth. The macroeconomic explanation for
the change in the value of housing relative to cor-
porate stock is that accelerating inflation in the
1970s coupled with a non-neutral tax system in-
creased the.effective corporatetax rate. This expla-
nation implies that the housing boom was not based
on fundamental demand factors but peculiar fea-
tures in the tax system and inflation. These factors
can be reversed, so as we look forward to lower
inflation and taxes in the 1980s, we might also look
with trepidation to falling house prices and a stag-
nant homebuilding industry.
APPENDIX
The rate of return to stocks was calculated as
follows:
(StockReturn), = SD'+I + (SP'+I - SP,)/SP,
where:
SD the dividend yield on the Standard and
Poor's 500 composite common stock
index.
SP = the price ofthe Standard and Poor's 500
composite common stock index.
The rate of return to housing was calculated as
follows:
(Housing Return), = [RENT, + (HP'+I - HP,)]/HP,
where:
RENT = the rental return to housing calcu-
lated by using the rent componentof
the CPI normalized by the rent for
residences in 1972.
HP = the price of housing calculated
by using the Department of Com-
merce's price index for new one-
family houses sold, normalized by
the median home price in 1972.
II
This paper couples the macroeconomic explana-
tion with a more fundamental microeconomic ex-
planation. thatthe demand. for housing increased
becauseofdemographic change. The large increase
in households during the last decade also can ex-
plain house and stock prices over the period. The
aging baby boom and the rapid rate of household
formation swelled the real demand for housing.
While household formation in the 1980s should
grow less rapidly than in the 1970s, thedemograph-
ic factors will continue to exert demandpressure on
the housing market through most ofthis decade.
The evidence in this paper indicates that both
inflation and household formation affected the re-
turns to stock and housing. For the future, this
means that while disinflation should help the stock
market and reduce the speculative tax-induced de-
mand for housing, the fundamental demographic-
based demand for housing will remain strong.
FOOTNOTES
1. These calculations use the Standard and Poor's stock
index, the CPI, and data on home prices from Census
Reports G-25 and G-27.
2. See Lawrence H. Summers, p. 429.
3. Michael Sumichrast, et ai, Profile of a New Home
Buyer: 1979 Survey of New Home Buyers (Washington,
D.C.: National Association of Home Builders.)
4. ARIMA models are a statistical forecasting procedure in
which future values are forecast from past values. Actual
values, orperlect foresight, give similar results.
5. The correlation between the series is .86.
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